This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors' state cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.
Introduction
In representative democracies, elections are the voters' tool for making incumbent politicians pay attention to their constituents' interests. While in office, politicians attempt to build a reputation that can help them get reelected with votes Case, 1995, 2003; List and Sturm, 2006) and campaign contributions (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) . However, when reelection is no longer possible due to a binding term limit, voters lose their main tool for holding the politician accountable, and interest groups can no longer count on future help.
The literature studying political reputation-building behavior by politicians has recently documented how state fiscal and environmental policies are used to attract certain voter groups to governors' platforms (Besley and Case 2003; List and Sturm 2006) . List and Sturm (2006) present a two-policy model where a politician sets both "primary policies" (e.g., government spending or the extent of wealth redistribution) and "secondary policies" (e.g., environmental policy or trade policy). Their model predicts that if the secondary policy is some voters' main priority, politicians may distort the secondary policy to attract such "single-issue voters." The state cigarette tax is (in our view) an example of a secondary policy, and this is the policy focus in the current paper. Taxation of tobacco products is a relatively important issue in the U.S. For example, in 1997 U.S. tobacco farmers sold tobacco leaf valued at $2.9bn, U.S. consumers spent $52.6bn on tobacco products (out of which $5.7bn was federal taxes, and $7.8bn was state and local taxes), and 1 to 2 million jobs are supported by the tobacco industry (farming, manufacturing, wholesale, and retailing), according to Gale et al. (2000) . Uri and Boyd (1995) find that a $1 per pack equivalent increase in the excise tax on tobacco products could cause a fall in the consumption of all goods and services in the U.S. by approximately 0.49 percent, a fall in tobacco consumption by more than 12 percent, a decline in total utility by almost 0.5 percent, and a net increase of government revenue by more than 1.7 percent.
1 Various voter and interest groups have intense preferences over state cigarette taxes. These groups include cigarette smokers, but also factor owner lobby groups and workers in agricultural tobacco production and in the cigarette (tobacco products) manufacturing industry. These groups all favor lower cigarette taxes. 2 On the other hand, anti-smoking groups favor higher cigarette taxes.
Electoral incentives are not the only consideration of politicians, however. In addition to votes, politicians care about financial contributions from special interest groups. For example, Glantz and Begay (1994) , Goldstein and Bearman (1996) , Morley et al. (2002) , and Luke and Krauss (2002) all argue that lobbying is an important influence on policy in the area of state cigarette taxation. 3 In this paper, we rely on the theoretical framework developed by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) , who argue that politicians build a reputation with various lobby groups. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) argue that over time, as a politician's credibility rises as a champion of a particular group's interest, the politician will be supported with larger amounts of campaign contributions by groups close in ideology. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) also suggest that as the probability rises that the politician leaves office, the level of contributions will decline. 4 Since a lame duck governor has a probability equal to unity of leaving office, it follows that contributions given to such governors should decline sharply. In the area of tobacco, lobbying is carried out both by tobacco farmers, the tobacco manufacturing industry, and by antismoking groups. 5 Our first objective in this paper is to study whether U.S. governors use cigarette taxes to (i) build reputation among voters with a strong interest in the tax rate, and/or
(ii) build reputation among agricultural and manufacturing lobby groups with a large stake in cigarette taxation.
Anecdotal evidence indeed indicates that governors use cigarette taxes to build reputation and gain re-election, and then raise this tax during the lame duck term. In our analysis of reputation building, we also contribute by incorporating insights from the literature on fiscal federalism: policies set by one level of government have been found to influence the policies set by the government at another level. We therefore believe the results from the literature on vertical tax interactions should be taken into consideration in empirical studies of state cigarette taxation. This literature establishes that states set taxes (e.g., cigarette, gasoline, income, and corporate taxes) conditional on the federal cigarette tax rate (see, e.g., Besley and Rosen, 1998; Devereux et al., 2007) . 7 This suggests that governors may take the federal tax rate into consideration also when engaging in reputation building activities. Our 5 Morley et al. (2002) report that spending by the Tobacco Institute (an anti-tax tobacco industry lobby group) increased significantly in Ohio in 1991-92 preceding the 1993 cigarette tax of 6 cents per pack; spending in Utah and Washington State rose sharply in 1995-96 during which time their state cigarette taxes however increased significantly. Goldstein and Bearman (1996) List and Sturm (2006) , but reputation building is also related to lobby group activity, as suggested by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) . Moreover, the policy effects of these reputation building activities are conditional on the federal cigarette tax. Lame duck governors raise the state cigarette tax by more, the lower the federal cigarette tax. We believe our empirical results complement existing findings in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II further outlines the theoretical predictions provided by the literature, and gives a brief overview of the existing empirical literature. Section III discusses the empirical model and data. Section IV presents the results, and Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical and Empirical Background
Theoretical Predictions Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) argue that politicians seek to build up a favorable reputation with lobby groups through repeated interactions over time. 8 As time passes, a politician's credibility rises with a particular interest group due, e.g., to a consistent voting record and high effort level on behalf of the group(s) (e.g., by drafting bills, negotiating with legislators, giving media interviews, or by meeting and persuading voters). This reduces uncertainty for the lobby groups regarding policy outcomes (see also Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989) . As time progresses, the politician increasingly receives support only from groups close in ideology and policy preferences. The amounts of campaign contributions received increase due to the reputation building activities. However, these funds disappear when the politician faces a certain eviction from office. Consistent with the findings by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) , we assume that a lame duck governor receives lower amounts of campaign contributions by the agricultural tobacco and cigarette manufacturing lobbies. Thus, the term-limited politician has a lower incentive to set a cigarette tax that deviates from her most-preferred policy. List and Sturm (2006) present a two-policy model where a politician sets both a frontline policy and a secondary policy. Voters have heterogeneous preferences over policies. While most voters have no preferences over the secondary policy, for some voters the secondary policy is of greater importance than the frontline policy. There is uncertainty regarding the politician's preferences over the secondary policy. The model predicts that if the secondary policy is some voters' main priority, politicians may distort the secondary policy to attract "single-issue voters."
An increase in the number of voters that can be attracted by distorting the secondary policy raises 8 An extensive theoretical literature on lobbying predicts that politicians distort policy in exchange for campaign contributions. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) focus on explaining the organization of the U.S. Congress into committees. Grossman and Helpman (1994) develop a seminal menu auction model where campaign contributions are exchanged for more favorable trade policies. The findings in this literature suggest that tobacco manufacturing industry and agricultural tobacco sector lobbying will have a negative effect on state cigarette tax rates. the probability that incumbent governors engage in reputation-building activities. 9 In equilibrium, even politicians with views opposite to the single-issue voters may seek to placate this voter group by distorting their policy choice in order to win re-election. However, when politicians face a binding term limit they set their preferred policies rather than strategically distorting policies, since gaining votes and re-election are no longer considerations (consistent with, e.g., Alesina, 1988) . This view is supported empirically by Besley and Case (1995) who report that lame duck governors do not appear to care for either their own or their party's reputation, as evidenced by the finding that only re-electable governors respond to natural disasters by raising expenditures. Thus, we expect re-electable governors to attract smokers to their platform by lowering the cigarette tax, but to raise this tax as they gain lame duck status. Besley and Case (1995) provide a model where voters with imperfect information re-elect a governor with a higher probability, the greater the incumbent's effort (which yields more "successful" policies and high voter utility) and reputation (see also Barro, 1970; Banks and Sundaram, 1998) . In the governor's final term she finds herself a lame duck without re-election prospects, with no payoff from building reputation. Thus, she puts in less effort and her policy choices differ from earlier periods, consistent with List and Sturm (2006) .
10
The theoretical literature on vertical tax interactions identifies a multitude of opposing and ambiguous effects of a federal tax on state commodity taxes. The impact of the federal tax rate depends on the price-elasticity of demand, revenue effects, the extent of cross-border shopping, and on the degree of horizontal tax competition (see, e.g., Besley and Rosen 1998; Keen 1998; Devereux et al. 2007) . 11 It follows that governors are likely to take the federal tax 9 List and Sturm (2006) argue that the pressure to attract these voters also depends on the electoral pressures faced by the politician (reflected by the vote margin). This aspect is not a focus of the present paper, and thus we abstract from this issue in our empirical analysis. 10 See Dick and Lott (1993) and Bernhardt et al. (2004) for additional theoretical contributions. 11 Devereux et al. (2007) argue that the price-elasticity of demand (the elasticity of the tax base) is an important determinant of the sign of the tax reaction function. With price-inelastic individual demand and a high incentive to undertake inter-state shopping, the federal tax will not matter for the state tax; Devereux et al. (2007) argue that these conditions match the U.S. market for cigarettes (when demand instead is elastic, the response is ambiguous).
rate into account when building reputation, as the cost of acquiring a reputation (and distorting state tax policy) will depend on the federal tax. Moreover, it appears probable that state legislatures' willingness to change state taxes (or not) is conditional on the corresponding federal tax, as the marginal effect of, e.g., a state tax increase is influenced by existing taxes levied by other levels of government.
Empirical Literature
The related empirical literatures contain a multitude of results. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) find that older U.S. House representatives and those who announce their retirement (from the Banking Committee) face declining PAC contributions, as they can no longer benefit from the reputation they have built with lobby groups. The empirical literature on the impact of reputation-building on tax policy includes the important contribution by Besley and Case (1995) , who find that Democratic lame duck governors set significantly higher per capita total state taxes and state expenditures than other governors. Millimet et al. (2004) report that Republican lame ducks raise taxes and spending per capita more than do Democratic lame ducks. 12 List and Sturm (2006) establish that governors' environmental policy (the secondary policy) choices change notably once they obtain lame duck status, and the change is conditional on the environmental preferences of the electorate.
In the empirical literature on vertical tax interactions reports diverging results, Rosen (1998) (using 1975-89 data) and Devereux et al. (2007 Devereux et al. ( ) (using 1977 find some
On the other hand, when price-elastic individual demand and little reason exists for inter-state shopping, the federal tax affects the state tax negatively when demand is linear, but positively if demand is iso-elastic. Besley and Rosen (1998) argue that a revenue effect arises from the need of states to raise tax rates in order to keep state revenues intact as the federal tax rises. This suggests that state and federal taxes should be positively associated. Besley and Rosen (1998) and Keen (1998) in addition argue that a higher federal tax increases the marginal value of state public goods, raising the attractiveness of the state tax. Keen (1998) suggests that a higher federal tax raises the consumer price and thus reduces demand for the good. Consequently, the welfare loss resulting from the state tax declines, yielding a positive effect on the state tax. Besley and Rosen (1998) argue that endogenous expenditure effects may induce states to reduce public spending in response to a higher federal tax, yielding an ambiguous link between federal and state taxes. Moreover, Besley and Rosen (1998) suggest that there could be substitutability and complementarity effects among various taxes in the presence of non-separabilities in demand, implying an ambiguous response by states.
positive effects on U.S. state cigarette and gasoline taxes of an increase in the corresponding federal excise tax. 13 This literature has not previously been incorporated in studies of reputationbuilding, and has not discussed such issues in the area of agricultural sector policy making.
III. Empirical Analysis

The Empirical Model
Drawing on the existing theories and empirical results discussed above, we distill three empirically testable implications. First, in states with more active agricultural tobacco and cigarette manufacturing lobby groups (with more at stake, as discussed by Potters and Sloof, 1996) and thus more intense reputation building by governors, we should see a sharper temporal difference in the state cigarette tax as governors reach lame duck status. Second, the temporal difference in the cigarette tax when a governor is re-electable versus a lame duck should depend on the fraction of voters with a relatively intense interest in the cigarette tax rate, reflected by the share of voters classified as smokers. The larger is this set of voters, the greater is the incentive of governors to build reputation with the help of cigarette taxes, by moving away from her blisspoint policy. Finally, if state cigarette taxes are set conditional on the federal cigarette tax, reputation building behavior should also be conditional on the federal cigarette tax. Thus, we evaluate whether the temporal difference in the cigarette tax set by a re-electable and a lame duck governor may be conditional on the federal cigarette tax. The following empirical model is estimated:
where is the real cigarette tax rate in state i in year t, Fig. 1 presents the pattern of real cigarette tax rates over the sample period for: (i) the three states with greatest real increases (CA, NY, and WA); (ii) the three states with the greatest real declines (KY, NC, and VA); and the real federal tax rate.
Data on gubernatorial term limits come from List and Sturm (2006) . LAMEDUCK takes a value of one in years where the incumbent governor is facing a binding term limit, and zero otherwise. In many U.S. states governors face term limits after two terms in office. However, one term, three terms, and no term limits also existed during our sample period. 1975 -2000) . These variables represent the lobbying impact of the agricultural tobacco lobby and the tobacco manufacturing industry lobby, respectively. With local production activity, lobbying influence is likely to be stronger, since more is at stake for the industry in such states (see, e.g., Potters and Sloof, 1996) .
According to Jacobson et al. (1997) , the tobacco industry wields its strongest influence at the state level. See Table A2 in the appendix for information about exact cut-off values and states.
Data on agricultural tobacco production comes from USDA (various years); and data on tobacco/cigarette manufacturing comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce (various years)).
We utilize similar control variables as Besley and Rosen (1998) . In order to control for political party dominance, we use (i) a dummy variable equal to one if the state governor is a Democrat (DEMOGOV), (ii) the proportion of Democrats in the state Senate (DEMOSENATE), and (iii) the proportion of Democrats in the state House (DEMOHOUSE). Note that Nebraska has a non-partisan, unicameral legislature due to the unicameral system of the state legislature.
We therefore drop Nebraska completely from our data set, following, e.g., Reed (2006) Census Bureau (various years)).
15 All models also include POPULATION and INCOME squared, as well as a time trend and its square.
Next, TOBACCO INCOME equals tobacco production (lbs) per dollar of state income, and comes from USDA (various years); it measures the relative importance of tobacco for the state. In addition, GAS measures gasoline production per dollar of state income. Tobacco producers may be expected to lobby for lower cigarette taxes, while gasoline producers should take the opposite stance (attempting to reduce the need to raise gas tax revenue). GRANTS is federal grants/capita, which reduces the need to raise state tax revenues. INCOME TAX is the federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income, which seeks to capture the ability of states to engage in further taxation effort. The daily gasoline production data comes from the U.S.
Department of Energy (various years) database, whereas federal grant and income tax data
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau (various years).
IV. Empirical Results
Tables 2 -4 present our fixed-effects models. As shown by Moulton (1986) (not reported). Table 2 present results for our measure of the share of voters most likely making a lower state cigarette tax a high priority (SMOKER STATE), with three classifications based on different cutoff levels (see Table A2 ). Our classification of SMOKER STATE varies between cutoffs at seven states (at least 26.36% of the population are smokers) and 13 states (at least 25% of the population are smokers). 17 Models IV-IX in Table 2 report results using our two measures of interest group lobbying intensity; the classification of TOBAC STATE varies between cutoffs at 6 states (at least 500 lbs agricultural tobacco production per real GSP) and 17
Basic Model Results
Models I-III in
states (positive amount of agricultural tobacco production). The classification of MANUF STATE varies between cutoffs at 6 states (at least 0.1% of real GSP comes from tobacco manufacturing) and 18 states (positive amount of tobacco manufacturing). See Table A2 in appendix for further details.
In Table 2 , 39 out of the 45 reported coefficients are significant, with signs highly consistent across models. The models in Table 2 Why is lame duck behavior conditional on the federal tax? Besley and Rosen (1998) argue that states raise tax rates in order to keep state revenues intact when the federal tax is high; Keen (1998) suggests that a higher federal tax raises the consumer price and reduces demand with the consequence that the welfare loss resulting from the state tax declines; and both Besley and Rosen (1998) and Keen (1998) cents, while at one std.dev. below (above) the mean she raises (cuts) it by 2.61 cents (1.15 cents).
Our results suggest that governors engage in reputation building activities aimed at voters and tobacco lobby groups. Moreover, the degree to which voters and lobby groups hold governors accountable is conditional on federal tax policy. If the federal tax is relatively low, reputation building appears more accentuated. Lame ducks may face less resistance to tax hikes from the state legislature and other interests with sway over cigarette taxes when the federal tax is relatively low. On the other hand, if high federal taxes are in place, lame duck governors may be pressured to lower the state tax, as agricultural and manufacturing tobacco special interests continue to lobby to a greater extent when the federal tax takes more of a bite. Moreover, revenues, tax welfare losses, and the marginal value of public goods may play a role (Besley and Rosen, 1998; Keen, 1998) . Tables 3 and 4 offer robustness analysis (no controls reported; available upon request).
Robustness Analysis
The three panels in Table 3 present results using the middle-case cut-offs for the classifications as SMOKER STATE (10 states), TOBAC STATE (13 states), and MANUF STATE (13 states), respectively (remaining cases available upon request). In Model I in Table 3 , FEDTAX is instrumented by the federal deficit as a percentage of national GDP and national unemployment following Besley and Rosen (1998) and Devereux et al. (2007) . The state and federal cigarette tax rates may simultaneously be affected by some common factor, which might motivate federal and state governments to act simultaneously. For example, new information may become available on the adverse health effects of smoking. Moreover, the federal government may also be influenced by state governments' tax changes.
In Model II in Table 3 , FEDTAX is allowed to affect STATETAX with a one year lag (FEDTAX -1 ). State legislatures may react with a delay to federal legislative action, or state legislation may be implemented with a lag. Model III includes only states without any changes in the term limit legislation, as such changes may be simultaneously determined (Besley and Case 1995) . Model IV includes only states having term limit legislation at some point during the sample period (see List and Sturm 2006) , which forces us to drop 11 states (see Table A1 in the appendix). Model V adds NEIGHBORTAX, which controls for horizontal tax interactions (see Brueckner 2003; Devereux et al. 2007 ). We utilize the population weighted tax set by neighboring states, instrumented by the population weighted state unemployment rate, the percentage of children and old in the population, and the proportion of Democrats in the state House, following Rork (2003) (see also Devereux et al. 2007) . Model VI includes a lagged dependent variable, STATETAX t-1 , which is likely to be appropriate if state taxes exhibit strong serial correlation (Devereux et al. 2007 Table 4 provides a fixed-effects analysis using several different combinations of the state classifications discussed above, using various cut-off levels.
Results of Robustness Analysis
The robustness results reported in the three panels in Table 3 
V. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that state governors engage in reputation building strategies in the area of cigarette taxation, and that these strategies are focused on winning the approval among smoking voters, and in particular the agricultural tobacco lobby and the tobacco 7 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year Tax 
